



LESSONS LEARNED RECORD OF INTERVIEW

Project Title and Code:

LL-03 – U.S. Perception and Responses to Corruption in Afghanistan

Interview Title:

Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Interview Code:

LL-03- [REDACTED]

Date/Time:

July 28, 2015 3:00-5:00pm

Location:

Washington, DC

Purpose:

This interview was conducted in order to discuss the USG role in developing a secure Afghanistan through the establishment of the Afghan National Police and how corruption and non-agency collaboration was a hindrance to that development.

Interviewees:(Either list interviewees below, attach sign-in sheet to this document or hyperlink to a file)**SIGAR Attendees:**

Brittany Gates (Research Analyst) and Kate Bateman (Research Analyst)

Non-attribution Basis:	Yes	X	No	
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Recorded:	Yes		No	X
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Recording File Record Number:**Prepared By:** (Name, title and date)

Brittany Gates (Research Analyst) August 10, 2015

Reviewed By: (Name, title and date)

James Wasserstrom, Strategic Advisor and Project Lead – August 13, 2015

Key Topics:

- The early years of the ANP
- Interagency and donor cooperation and collaboration
- Spread security throughout the country to curb corruption



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Starting up the ANP

- Going into it, there was a culture of low-level corruption. In the U.S. intervention, it was set up to begin with. There were trade-offs on alternatives. The focus was on getting the minimum of security set in place with expectation that they will go back to fix it later.

2001/2002 Germany's the Lead, But We'll Create the Real Plan

- In 2001, we didn't do a whole lot. It was our research phase. There wasn't any anticipation that Afghanistan would be a huge thing. That changed in December 2001 with the Bonn Conference. Afterwards, the German's, who were the lead donor in charge of setting up the Afghan police force, had a 30 year plan. I remember being told that we have to come up with the real plan. The Germans wanted to bring back the training center, the Kabul Police Academy (1 year non-commissioned and in 3 years commissioned).
- In 2002, there were thoughts on development and democracy assistance. It was figured that more security was needed. So we came up with the Central Training Center (DOJ-ICITAP Police Lead) in Kabul with a focus on the Ministry of the Interior.

ANP Training

- It became increasingly needed to train police force throughout the country to ensure security so that they can have elections. 20,000 police were "trained" to help with the elections. We had two training programs. One was a three week TIP (Transition in Policing) Program which included a talk on human rights issues. The second was an eight week basic police procedures program. Our \$2 million budget soared to \$20-50 million.
- While Germany is still in the lead and training, our training was meant to be a slow-paced supplement to what the Germans were doing ended up being a fast-paced program not only focused on Kabul but other Afghan regions. INL's programs were done through DynCorp; ICITAP also did some training in Kabul.
- I wasn't excited about rushing. Illiterate officers only got 4 weeks of training. This version was created to do 4 weeks for someone to help and then bring them back to finish training them. The vast majority were going through a 4 week course; which was good for providing elections security, but not for building a better force. By the time of elections, 30,000 were listed as being trained, but not all were 30,000 "unique individuals." We had no great way of tracking and vetting people. So then we decided to develop and identification process.

Paying the ANP

- As to the pay issue, there was no central banking system. To pay the officers, people were driving the money out. So everyone is taking their cut, all the way down the line. The best way to get around it, make it clear how much everyone is getting in their cut. We did develop a national ID card for the police forces. An actual card at first and then one with a chip in it which would let you know how much was disbursed. I'm not sure if that got off the ground. It may have been lost in the transition when the program moved to DOD.



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Interagency and Donor Collaboration

- From 2000-2004, the only other player on the police was DOJ. Collaboration with the Germans was okay. It started to go south when security went south, the counternarcotics efforts, and when State and DOD began to fight. DOD took it to a place that Germans were not comfortable at all with.

AIOG meetings

- AIOG meetings, under (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), were contentious, but great. You were able to interact with people not working on security/police programs. They helped give you a whole picture on the reconstruction effort. SVTC's occurred from 2001-2002 prior to AIOG meetings. These meetings were in the operation department at State with Kabul and were 100% security focused. As security situation increased, AIOG starts to deteriorate. The DOD thinking was that the security situation would get worse if there was a poppy deterioration effort. They did nothing to sustain relations with the citizens. Now focus was only on security. The MOI training of internal affairs and training in Herat.

Creating a System to Tackle the Corruption Challenge

- The culture of corruption within the police force, people are taking money for doing a service to ensure they are trustworthy. We needed something more comprehensive to tackle the challenge. There was no training being done at the Senior Level (Generals) The U.S. was focused on training basic recruits, the Afghan Highway Patrol, and the Customs and Borders Police. The Germans were focused on training officers and non commissioned officers. But the problem that had yet been addressed was that there was no record to indicate positions of some police. With the Pay and Rank Reform Program, you go through and vet everyone in a senior level position (rank by rank, rebalance, and ensure those that have a rank and being paid for it and nothing less). [REDACTED] was supportive of the program. We sole-sourced everything to Dyncorp and wondered if it makes sense for Dyncorp to do it. State's Acquisition Management Office (AQM) handled the contract. There wasn't a clear decision that they weren't going to complete this; wanted Afghan buy-in.

ANP Training Shifts to DOD

- When the military took over, it was a hostile takeover. Highway patrol was a problem for AID delivery; Family Response unit.
- The Secretaries of State and Defense agreed that DOD would take over. There was Congressional opposition to it. The 4-1-2005 cable that said the DOD shall lead and State shall direct. But Congress appropriates \$363 million. Leahy and Rieser would have been opposing the DOD takeover and pushing for an increase of funding. The task order was recomputed; MOI for professional development, ANP for training, and Justice Sector got training from the Pacific Architects and Engineers. State was focused on a successful bid over quality. So you had different contractors in the same place on the field.
- DOD's slow takeover (defining training of the programs). Priority becomes making the ANP a security force. DOD then pushed for and kept the MOI Professional Development program. They would vet senior officials and send to the MOI (from 2006-2007). This was the first vetting iteration of the pay and rank reform program. 2/3 extra names were added to the list (Afghans felt strongly to push back). Increasingly occurred as time went on to have more push back on reform as Afghan personnel changed. It was based on the power to maintain. They



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less they behaved, the more money we threw out at them. There was no real incentive to reform. But we couldn't give up on the police. We focused resources where it was bad; so we built on the police in those places where security was fine to set a fine example.

- The Rebalancing Initiative, was possible a U.S. General's idea, didn't work. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police was Karzai's idea and was the beginning of the end. The military is not vetting them. It became the Afghan Local Police (ALP). It's important to note that as they were doing things in Iraq, they were importing those ideas into Afghanistan.

Coordination in 2006-2007

- In 2006/2007, the military was making all the decisions. Coordination with the Germans was non-existent. UNAMA had a police advisor on the ground. The U.S. had its campaign plan and a non-negotiable position. They cannot tackle corruption; did not do on the ground analysis of what corruption means to the Afghans. There was no sense of collaboration within the agencies. But there was no incentive past the Principle and Deputy Committee meetings. It would have been beneficial to coordinate on what all the agencies are doing and how it could have helped your projects. For example, USAID's democracy, governance, and rule of law programs have some sort of alignment with police reform. There was way more room for collaboration.

Final Thoughts on Lost Opportunities to Combat Corruption

- Iraq diverted military resources and military attention away from Afghanistan. The elections made it easy for them to leave. There's a DOD/State Joint IG Report. The mindset of some people in State is very defeatist; it's very ingrained in the culture. We were all optimistic in the early years until the security situation deteriorated. There was a resource disparity and country prioritization. The environment changed and people got disillusioned. Emphasis began to increase (2007-onward) with a focus on corruption and rule of law, such as the Regional Justice Police Integration Program (R-J-PIP). There was no emphasis from 2005-2007. Once funding was done with the police and went to DOD, Justice Sector reform increased. It's important to define the "coordinator" role by country and providing direction/leadership versus taking control. There was a major international coordinating meeting in Berlin 2004 and then one on security in Qatar 2006. Putting Afghanistan in a regional context and how cross-collaboration would have been helpful. No one looked into the how some Ford F-350s (with a tracker inside) ended up in Pakistan. We provided armored trucks that weren't effective or have much staying power. "Buy America" was huge. You had UNDP's LOTFA which was useful. But there was no incentive for Afghans to change. You can't combat corruption when you only do it at a State level. Watching anything we see of value that wasn't attributed of value to the Afghans - that was a bartering system. Supporting warlords and enforcing the security system they had was a huge problem. Giving them a measure of power and it's hard to take it away and combat.